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S'S ιρς rif?3
PERCEPTION, APPEARANCE AMP KXKSESIS: TEE SECRET BOCTEIH1 IH PLATO5S THEAETETUS^
The Thesetetus is perhaps* one of the most,puzzling dialogues in the 
Platonic corpus. Its ostensible purpose lies in the attempt to define 
knowledge. Yet the highest objects of knowledge, the Forms, which are so 
prominent - in other dialogues, are conspicuously absent here. Furthermore, 
the ontological region of becoming* to which Plato had already denied 
epistemological status, is quite extensively examined as a possible correlate 
of knowledge. Socrates gives an account of the realm of becoming by appealing 
to a theory of flux which would make kinesis the only .ontological principle«
This theory is elaborated at great length in the early part of the dialogue. 
Later, however, it is quite summarily refuted. Moreover, the refutation 
is directed not to the full explication of the doctrine which we find at 152 d- 
160 e, but to the bare statement of the theory itself* As Campbell remarks, 
the doctrine "is exploded by being precisely stated * " Yet if the position 
could be refuted even before it Is elaborated, why does Socrates bother with 
such a lengthy exposition?
The answer lies in his own statement at 155 d 10. He will help Theaetetus, 
he says,· to penetrate to the άλή&ειαχ* άτκΜεηρυμέν*ην in the thoughts of those 
who held a theory of flux. Were the theory to be refuted immediately, we 
would.avoid error, to be sure. But we would advance no further toward the 
grasping of truth« In his elaboration of the doctrine of flux, it might appear 
that Socrates is simply showing us the "usual confused statement" of, someone 
who holds that "the universe is change (kings!s) and nothing else." (156 a 5)
Yet something which, when experienced in the first person, could be a source 
of confusion and self-deception,, could, when viewed from an external perspective, 
provide an occasion for genuine insight* Theaetetus, who is listening, and we, 
who are reading, are in a position to discern that confusion to which a proponent 
of the theory is too close to recognise.
People who hold that "the universe is change and nothing else" could 
invest that position with plausibility for themselves by failing to see the 
ambiguity of its formulation. Crpmhie expresses the ambiguity quite succinctly 
as the difference between claiming that "all properties result from change" and 
claiming that "all properties are subject to change."2 The former claim 
could he termed a doctrine of Mitigated Flux and the latter, a doctrine of 
Radical Flux. A doctrine of Radical Flux is elicited from the assertion that 
"the universe is change and nothing else" by emphasizing the phrase, ’nothing 
else.1 If the assertion is taken as admitting no exceptions, then it would 
follow, as Socrates points out'at » that all things are always in all
kinds of change, in movement as well as in qualitative alteration. Once this 
is granted, then nothing could be "brought to a standstill" long enough to be 
designated as a perceived quality or as a perception. Hence, Socrates can 
concludes êmcrnfcnv xe α£οθησιν 06 ουγχαρτ}α5μεΒα κοχα γε ττ\ν tou rsdbxa 
, κινεΐϋθαι μέθοδον. (183 c 1-3)
*1 would like to thank Profs, 3. P* Maguire and Hans-Georg Gadamar for their 
many helpful comments during the writing of this paper, although this in no 
way commits them to everything maintained herein*
Ab Crombia has noticed, however, -this refutation destroys only one 
interpretation of the Flux Theory.* Once the full radicality of the theory 
has been stated, we can then, by reading the exposition retroactively, see 
even more clearly an alternate Interpretation of the theory to which the 
ctitiqim does not apply* This second interpretation, which we have called 
a theory of Mitigated Flux, claims that "the universe is change and nothing 
else** in the sense that the whole realm of appearances can be explained as 
being the effects of constant motion.* There is (qualitative) change in the 
world of appearances, certainly. The wine appears now as sweet, now as sour«
Yet the sweetness itself abides and is "brought to a standstill'9 at least long 
enough to be experienced* Hence, the extent of the existence of change is 
fsitigsiteds it is not the case that'all things are always in all kinds of change* 
On the other hand, the theory of Mitigated Flux is.in one sense absolutely 
radical, in that it attempts fco explain the whole realm of appearances by 
©ne and only one principle, kinesis*
This doctrine of Mitigated Flux is elaborated in the course of the 
discussion concerning the nature of knowledge. According to the first definition 
of. knowledge proposed by Theaatetus,. knowlege-is nothing other than aisthësis*
(151 e 2-5) Protagoras, Socrates claims, had said the .same thingÿ but had 
formulated the position in a slightly different manner* He said that 
XPnu&mu μέτρον7ί είναι», < μεν 6ντων d¡c êcrrt, των δδ m  δντων ως
oôh £στιν»Λ (152 a 2-4)*^ By this he meant5 that ο€α yfiv έηαστα éuoï cpaCvemt 
xou^xa μεν êativ έμοί , ota 5ε oo£ , xotaOia 5ê a5 ooC - Svôpojioq âè σύ τε 
κάγώ» (152 a 6-8) Socrates now proposes to ’’follow up** the statements of 
Protagoras, hut in doing so he accomplishes, as we shall see, more than an 
innocuous deduction of consequences from a simple Protagorean position*
It sometimes happens, Socrates says, that when the same wind is blowing, 
one of us feels chilly, the other does not. (152 b) Given this situation, 
ίκτερον αδν τότε αυτό έφ* èmxoO το πνεϋιχχ ψυχρόν η ού ψύχραν φήοομεν? η 
πεια5μεθα τφ ΐ^ χαταγάροι ¿tí τφ μεν φιγάντι» ψυχρόν, τφ δε uh ou? <152 b 5-7) 
Theaetetus agrees to the latter and Socrates continues, saying that the wind 
"so appeârs" to each of us and that ? appearing? (phainetai) means the same 
as 'perceiving* (aisthanesthai), in the case of what is hot and so forth*
Thus, given that the wind appears warm to you and cold to me and that * appearing * 
mem s the same as 'perceiving/ Protagoras* second, proposition could be identified 
with Theaetetus’ definition, since perception has the two necessary marks of 
knowledge*(152 c $-6) Further, Protagoras* original assertion is founded on 
the same conditions. Since the wind appears'warm to you and not cold, and 
since it appears cold to me and not warm, each of m  is the measure both that 
a thing is (of a certain quality) and that it is not (of a certain quality)*
The identification of the three propositions (Protagoras* two statements 
mû Theaetetus* definition), however, is not so simple as it might seem· Ho 
conclusion at all about the nature of the-.wind "in itself** is entailed by 
Protagoras* second statement* It would imply only that the wind~as~appearlng~ 
tourne is cold (in appearance) * while the wind-as-appearlng-to-you is warm 
(in appearance).** At first glance it would seem that Socrates realises this 
and properly formulates a Protagorean positions the wind is cold to the one 
who feels chilly and not to the other. Yet in the context of Socrates9 query 
(152 h 6-7), the (implicit)*’ subject of the (implicit) verb could not refer' to 
what we could call the phenomenal wind, hut rather to the wind in itself· the 
question he asks at 152 b 6-7 can be explicitly stated ass "Shall we be persuaded 
by Protagoras that the wind in itself is cold to the one who feels chilly, and
sot to the other?” Given that the nature of the wind in itself is not a 
Protagorean issue, it can be seen that Socrates is manipulating the doctrine 
of Protagoras while claiming that he is only "following up" its implications. 
Beginning with the exposition of the Secret Doctrine at 156 a, we shall see 
that the problem of what something might be in itself* and bow it is related to 
appearances is the central concern of the discussion. As J. P. Maguire has 
noted» "the additional question <152 b 5), whether the wind in itself (οώτδ 
έφ* έαχηφ) is cold or not cold, is Plato’s own * designed to shift the discussion 
from the subject to the object, from Frotagoreanism to what he considered to 
be a necessarily correlative Keraciifceanism."?
* *
Socrates’ final remarks on the wind example 'reveal his manipulative 
technique’s even more clearly. He concludes? Αιαθηστς &xx του όντας άε£ tcrciv 
îcat dsieuôeç έταοτήμη’ ofea. <152 c 5-6) The key phrase in this statement is 
fOiCa0f^ t€<» » *toö όντος*. ♦ fecnrtv, * In light of Socrates’ treatment of the wind 
example,$fche natural interpretation of this phrase would be that perception, is 
always of something that is (of such and such. a quality) · insofar as it is 
perceived by a perceiver, whatever the extra-perceptual ontological status of 
the -"thing in itself" might be.
There is another possibility of Interpretation, however, which, although 
not justified fully by Socrates* preceding reflections on the wind example, can 
be justified after the following elaboration of the doctrine of flux. To say 
that perception is always of something that is could also mean that perception, 
as such, guarantees the ontological status of its object. This latter, in 
tura, is ambiguous in that it could be concerned with the phenomenal object in 
its status qua phenomenon, or it could be concerned with the transphenomenal 
object (e.g.* the wipd "in itself"). Were Protagoras concerned with the issue 
of ontology at all, presumably he would have been amenable to granting ontological 
status to the phenomenal object. Yet as two of Socrates’ statements clearly 
imply, Protagoras’ second proposition (and his first interpreted in light of the 
second) involves a claim, not about being or not-being as such, but about being 
or not being such (as one perceives) (cf. 152 a 6-8 and 152 e 1-3).
This second way of interpreting 152 c 5-8 (that perception guarantees its 
object) will appear later in the exposition as being applicable on both the 
phenomenal and the transphenomenal levels. We will find that an aisthesis 
guarantees (and is guaranteed by) its correlative aistheton and that the 
perceiving patient guarantees (and is guaranteed by) its correlative perceived 
agent. Thus, Socrates* final summation at 152 c 5~6 is expressed in such a 
way that, in virtue of its ambiguity,-it"points backward to his treatment of ^  
Protagoras and forward to his examination of-the Secret Doctrine which will 
deal with the transphenomenal ground of appearances. .
* As a method of introducing the Secret Doctrine, Socrates suggests (152 c 
0**1O) that perhaps the doctrine just considered was that which Protagoras openly 
professed, whereas he may have endorsed" another view which he revealed only to 
his disciples, Socrates does not conceal the fact that there is no evidence that 
Protagoras actually held, such a view. Indeed, he refers later to the "theory 
which we are attributing to Protagoras.Fî (155 d 6) In the immediate context, 
he indicates that the whole pre-socratic poetic and philosophic tradition, with
the exception of the philosophy of Parmenides,· is the authority to which we must 
look for the Secret Doctrine. The ultimate import of the doctrine* as wé shall 
see, will lie in its role as providing an ontological foundation for the
epi&CráQXoglcal doctrine expressed in this earlier Protagorean formulas*
Surprisingly»· Socrates* initial statement of the Secret Doctrine would 
lead on#· to suppose that it is not 'the foundation of the Fublic Doctrine, but 
simply an alternate expression of it,- Hit says? 'Sw έρω m  ράλ'ού Φα&Λον 
Μίτον* ώς· test ¿v μεν tsfab m&'dteo οόδΙν έστιν, oùâ Jh* τι, nocreCrtotc teSws^  
oôd* ànotovcCjy τι» άλλ* έον ώς νέγα τιροααεγορεύος, moa outxpSu αονεΐται, hcu, 
éte βαρύ/ KoCkpov/ oCvavxé τε ofaug, êç υηδεν6ς ôvrôç êvoç -μήτε τίνος μήτε
■ ôrmoxsOv* (152 â 2-6) . Swch a formulation of the Secret Doctrine would allow 
one to subsume under it the wind example discussed in «.the ¿mediately 
preceding passage. Nothing is one thing just by itself in the *énse that 
anything which appears, a,g., the wind* will appear now as having one contrary 
quality» now as having the other* It would not he possible » then* to say 
without qualification that the wind is warm* One must say that it is not only 
warm hut cold* Whatever the wind may be in itself, this is how it will 
appear (phaneifcai). therefore,* an interpretation of the status of the Secret 
Doctrine such as that suggested by Dlls would seem justified* He claims that 
it is "la these dont cet ensaignment public de Protagoras n*esz que la formule 
axotarique*w 9 o& this reading thm verb ’to be* la the sentence ’nothing is 
one thing just by itself* would, as in Protagoras5 Public Doctrine have only 
epistemological» not ontological import*
The shift to the ontological perspective is made at.152 d 7 - e 1*
Socrates says? έκ δδ δη φοράς τε m  κ^νήαεως m l  xpdbe&îg· προς άλληλα yCyvemt 
irótea%á 5ή φαμεν etwas,*. ούκ όρδως προααγ€ρεύσντες" fern μεν yap οί^έκοτ" ούόεν, 
tel 6è γίγνεται,» Here» it is no longer possible to maintain a purely phenomenal 
viewpoint. Radier, we are given an indication ôi the ontological ground (movement, 
change) of which the phenomenal world is the effect (έκ ôè φοράς) *
let curiously, the contrasting 8de* at the beginning of the above passage 
can’refer back only to the preceding ’men1 at 152 d 2-3? ώς âpa ëw yew aûxd 
καθ* OÔXO oûÔév êcrttv. Now Socrates’ Immediately following explication of this 
’men’ clause indicates that it is referring to the phenomenal level (c£* phaneital, 
153 4 5), whereas the occurrence of the preposition ¥ ak * in the yde’ clause. 
establishes its reference to the transphenomenal-ground of appearances. On the 
other hand, the ’roen-de’ structure itself would suggest that the second clause 
is the corrective, affirmative formulation of the notion negatively expressed 
in the first. The structure of the passages represents, I believe, the first 
evidence of that forward looking ambiguity which was detected in the phrase- 
’oCodnatC TOO δυτος écrrtv’ (152 c 5)^  and this ambiguity will be carried, throughout 
the exposition, by the formula 'êo μεν αώτα καθ'αώτα ούόεν £σαν«ν
the epistemological significance of the formula is, as we have .seen» 
identical to Protagoras’ Public Doctrine. Nothing is just by itself (qualified 
In ene way, without being qualified in another way)* But what is meant by ’’being5* 
qualified in this context is simply "appearing such to a perceiver*" Accordingly, 
ve might be misled If we concentrated only on the "objective" aspects of 
qualification mentioned by Socrates at 152 d 3 4« We will find ultimately that 
the epistemological interpretation of the formula» %èv μεν αύτδ καθ* αύτδ οδδεν 
écrruv,’ involves the experiential correlativity of aisfchSsis and aisthëton^ 
and that the ontological significance of the formula refers to the transphenomenai 
ground of the realm of appearances. But this ontological significance is not 
as easy to formulate as the epistemological reading* The following possibilities 
of interpretation will be found-at various points of the exposition (for convenience
these w ,11 be referred to as Οχ* 02» and
Οχ. Nothing is just by itself; rather, everytlng is Involved in 
« process of becoming* <152 e 1)
02* Nothing is just bv itself ; rather, an agent exists {or becomes) 
only in relation to a patient and vice versa. <15? a 3-7)
Qy Bothing is jnst by itselft rather, an alsthgsls, considered as
a fast motion, exists {.or becomes) only in relation to an aiathëton» 
considered as a fast motion, and vice versa. < 156 d $)
the significance of the lines at 153 d 2 -e 1 is, then, as follows. The 
gramatical· structure indicates that the two clauses, although presenting 
contrasting (negative and affirmative) formulations, are directing themselves 
to the same level of reference. Socrates* explications of the respective 
clauses, however, inserted immediately after each, show that they are to be 
interpreted as referring to different levels? the phenomenal and the trans- 
phenomenal. By this structure itself we are forewarned to pay careful attention 
to the formula *αύτο χαθ*<ώτο oôôév èoxtv* which, in spite of the consistency 
in expression, will exhibit a chameleon-like mutability in meaning as it moves 
from one context in the exposition to anothèr. * ‘
At 153 -^8 - 154 a 9, Socrates makes a preliminary attempt to specify the 
implications of the Secret Doctrine. In phraseology which recalls that of ¡L52 d 3, 
he says? νατά τα fitqjxca πρδταν, δ δη κολεός χρδρα λευκόν, ιιή εϊναι αυτό έτερον 
τι έξω t&j αων όμμάτων ynô' tv τοϋς δι&οσι μηόε τιν' σ&τφ χόραν άτΐοτάξι^ Γ ηδπ 
γάρ &ν ε£η τε 6ήηοι> έν τάξει και μέναν καί ούκ αν έν γενέσει yCyvαιτα* <153 d 8- 
e 2) Whereas Socrates’ explication of his earlier statement <152 d ff.) emphasised 
the contrary qualifications of (phenomena!) objects, his statements here focus 
on the nature of the qualities themselves. Furthermore, they do so with a 
view toward specifying the ontological ground of their appearance. A color 
is not ’’some distinct thing” either inside the eyes or outside the eyes <i.e*, 
inherent in a transphenomenal object). Here either of these possibilities to 
hold, the general ontological import (CL) of the Secret Doctrine formula would 
be compromised* in that the quality would remain at rest <i*e., be) rather 
than arising in a process of becoming (i.e*, movement). Given that nothing is 
one thing just by itself, it follows 'that? m l  ύμιν οβτω μέλαν τε καί λευκόν 
m l  οτιουν άλλα-χρώμα έχ της προσβολής τών όμμάτων προς τήν προσήκουααν cpopov 
cgovetmt γενενημένον, και ο δη émoiον εΙΓναέ φαμεν χαΒμα οδτε το ηροοβάλλον οΟτε 
το ΐ^οβαλλί^νον έαται, άλλα μεταξύ τι έκάστφ ίδιον γεγονός. (153 e 5 - 154 a 2)
In this context, the Secret Doctrine formula refers to the ontological ground of 
movement from which the appearances arise. It Is clear that the ’’thing itself*” 
e.g. * a stone, is simply a movement which encounters the eye and generates the 
color, not a stable substance remaining at rest. It is not yet explicitly 
stated that the eye itself is a motion* ^  This requirement is met as the'theory 
is expounded in greater detail, beginning at 156 a.
At the opening of the passage, Socrates states the first priniple espoused 
by those who are initiated into the Secret Doctrines τό nov κίνησις fjv καί άλλο 
παρά, τούτο οόόέν* <156 a 5) This statement is equivalent to the Οχ ontological 
waning of the Secret Doctrine as explicated at 152 e 1, and as re-asserted 
.■at 153 e 4-5· This ontological meaning, however, is ambiguous in that it could 
express a doctrine of Radical Flux or a doctrine of Mitigated Flux, the
lap! tentions of Radical Flux .left ln nheymnm until the refutation at 
.1821 f· $ and the theory of Mitigate?! Flux forms the principal basis of i:lie 
Secret Doctrine m  elaborated in the exposition* It is the radical!ty 
of the bare claim contrasted irith the mitigation of the development which 
creates tensions in tlm exposition«
Socrates begins his elaboration of the principle of#universal kinSsig 
by distinguishing two types: âùuouiv ôè xa μεν noteCv £χόν/ τδ 61 rSbxctv.
(156 a i * ? )  âs two motions- of opposite powers meet* they give rise t;o 
offspring* The offspring are’characterised as pairs of twins which coma 
into existence simultaneous!y« A perception. (e«g., seeing) is always 
correlative to something perceived (e«g** a .color)» Implicit in this account 
is the Secret Doctrine in its general ontological significance (that nothing 
is» but is always becoming, 0j) taken as the transphenomenal ground of 
phenomena. The intercourse and friction of these two types of motion with 
one another act as causes sufficient to produce the world of appearances in 
both its subjective (aistheaeis) and its objective (alethita) aspects*
Thus» there exists a double correlativity* The simultaneous generation 
of the experiential perception and its object is stated clearly* That the 
parents of the offspring are also simultaneously generated (as parents) In mié 
through their very act of producing offspring is hinted at by their classification 
m  either active or passive powers. This second correlativity» along with an 
unexpected third, will he introduced explicitly In the next passage*
Kingsois are classifiable, we find® not only according to the categories 
of active or passive power, but als© according to quickness or slowness 1n '■ 
speed. Up to this point, the active or passive powers which join to produce 
the phenomena have been the sole motions referred to* He would expect, then, 
that ®üœ notions with active power are slow, others are fast, and that some 
motions with passive power, "too, are slow whereas others move mare quickly.
Yet, oddly, Socrrat.es groups both active and passive powers together as' slow 
motions S' δααν μεν oöv βραδύ, έν τφ αύτψ καί προς τα ηληριάζσιηα τπν κένησιν 
facet Ηοί οόχω ôrj γενν$»(156 c 8 - .d 1) By contrast, the offspring generated 
by the slow motions move more quickly? τα 6ε γεν^να oÖto δη Μττω έατ£ν*
(156 d 1-2) From an examination of the immediately following lines, we see 
that the offspring are described in the same terms as in the preceding passage 
(156 b ϊ - ύ 3). Mere, however, they sea® to have a radically different 
status* The offspring are not merely the phenomenal results of transphenomenal 
motions; they have themselves a transphenomenal kinetic aspect«' * The offspring, 
we are told, move quickly from place to place in between the.two parents, hut 
certainly, the (phenomenal) offspring do not appear -to move. The white appears · 
to remain in the region of the stone and the seeing in t ha region of the eye*.
At 157 a 3 ~ 7, the correlativity of the parents of the offspring, which 
was only hinted at previously by their classification as powers » is brought out 
explicitly : tml m l  το iiotouv ε£ναί x v m i  το Tsdbxcv am w  hit èvoç vcftem f 
3& çaatv, c3&i etvat m y  tec- ούτε yap notow έσχι xt nplv αν τφ ηοοχοντι- ουνέλθΏ, ούτε 
nck^o^hptv &{c$ rtotouvTt-τό τέ xtvt αυνελθσν καί nouoGv άλ># aß îcpcxmeodv rœxov 
ó^ iCXSxSvn· One cab have no firm notion of either agent ©r- patient as being 
anything (just by Itself) in the sense that both come into being simultaneously 
in virtue of their encounter. But the· impossibility that an agent or patient 
.as such could exist by itself does not entail that its coming into being is. an 
absolute coming to be. the motions may exist as processes previous to their 
/ encounter with one another« Indeed, this seams to he the import of Socrates1 
distinction between motions as active or passive powers* Although a motion with
m  activa power would not he an agent actually * it would be one potentially.
Hence» we can have no notion of what is active or passive as having any being 
by itself qua actually active or passive (0 )^«
Socrates concludes his reflections at 15? a 7 -.b 1 by restating the , 
Secret Doctrine formula that "nothing is one thing just by itself,** This 
fomulas taken as equivalent to the statement that "the universe is change 
mâ nothing else** would express the general ontological meaning of the doctrine 
(Οχ)* As such, it has been the arche upon which Socrates* various conclusions 
have been based. Here » however * Socrates characterises it not as, a premise* 
but as a conclusion (έξ άπάντων τούτων, 15? a 7). Given that we have ascertained 
a certain elasticity in usage for this formula, we might suspect not that 
Socrates is presupposing what he is trying to prove, but that he is using the 
formula to express a different proposition.
The structure of the passage offers, Ϊ think, sufficient evidence that 
this is the case» We find a grammatical construction similar to the one by 
which the Secret Doctrine was first introduced (vis»s the *men-de* construction 
at 152 d). Socrates s&yss αύόεν εΕναι áv αυτό χαθ* aireó, άλΑά Ttvt del γΕγνεσΟαι* 
(15? a S - h 1) The contrasting 1 alla* serves here a function similar to the 
fyen-dey structure previously used. Given the insertion of *tini* into the 
contrasting clause, along with the "points made in the'preceding passage, the 
role of * hen * in the first clause takes on a new significance. In the general 
ontological interpretation of the formula (Οχ) the ’hen* all but disappears in 
light of the emphasis placed on ?esti.* In this passage, however, it- is taken 
for granted tffat being is to be eliminated from any ontological theory and 
only becoming (kingsis) is to be allowed as an explanatory principle* This 
having been assumed as an arehg, attention is then turned to specifying the types 
of motion«, But as it has turned out, the classification of motions according 
to various categories is not a mere (one is tempted to say, static) ordering, 
but a description which entails explanatory principles concerning the inter­
actions of these motions. The distinctions between active and passive, quick 
and slow motions, has led to a triple correlativity: between (1) the agent
and patient and between aisthisis 'and aistneton, considered as (2) experience! 
phenomena and as (3) transphenomenal fast motions.
The conclusion from these considerations is, certainly, that nothing is 
•one thing just by itself, rather Ttvt àzi γ£γνεοθαΐ· But the import of * tini* 
goes beyond its usual translation as "for someone,Since the context is 
emphasising co-relativity» it would seem that "for.something" as well as "for 
someone" is implied, Patients are not single things-by themselves » but«* coma to 
be in relation to.agents, and agents are not single things by themselves* but 
come to he fot patients. The same relationship would hold between aisthgseis 
and aistheta on both phenomenal and transph enomenal levels.
In the present context, then, the principle that "nothing i£ one thing by 
itself” (that there is universal kinesis) is taken as an arche for the further 
contention that "nothing is one thing just by itself»” 'This latter* in turn, 
involves the correlativity of the experiental aisthësis and aistheton (which 
is entailed by the Public Doctrine) and the correlativity of fast motions, on 
the one hand* and slow motions as parents'* on the other (ef, Og and O3)«
The lines immediately following the restatement of the Secret Doctrine 
formula, when juxtaposed with the assertions made at 156 a 1 - 15? b 1, reveal 
.the special manipulative nature of Socrates* exposition* After having used
fm formula to mxpmm coiraUttivicy* tie awlt'cte* to the general ■
mtological f ic&nc# of the theory of Oa.x (0, )* ,A$ we noted earlier, 0^ 
is equivalen to the assert lain of universal l.iriesîa, hut this assertion is 
ambigtu ion# i» that it could express a theory c.»f either lad leal or Mitigated Flu**
. The lit is 15? b I -8 state» hut do not draw the consequences of, a theory * 
of stadlcal ' lux; to όε eïvat iwm&ÔSev έ&χιρετέβν* *οΰκ árt ήυε?ς πολλά. m  
dim Ctó αυνηθεώις m  ά^ ι;ι.σπιι^ :ούυ?ις xprfato αύτφ. tô €e ou άε£,
¿ς è τθν a $£ÿ λόνος, côte ti wrxcccITv ούτε tou oötä £uoG côte TÔSe eût* iwetvo 
oGre âA&o ^ e v  βνσια Ikt àj tot$r ûMa mro $ΰσιν φΟέγγεοθέα· Ytrvdpeva wdEl TOtaö*- 
licw wJX t /K-AÂÛMew m  άλλθΜΧ^£ΛΧ&· Assuming the existence of radical flu*» 
we mast i 4# ao language which would stabilise: things» but rather speak 19in 
accorda» .e with nature'" of becomings» perishlngs,»and alterations. The theory 
of Hadii al flux is here entailed» not necessarily by the kind of language which 
is alio «à» hut by the kind which is forbidden. We should not use» it is claimed» 
words * ike f something » ' * somebody1 s»* tthisif or? that. * If "nature" really 
were f ich ths& none of these locutions were applicable» then» indeed, all things 
would always be in all kinds of change.
SmZ the passage which we have just dealt with (136 a 1 «“157 b 1) requires 
that ve be able to use'these expressions. Given that underneath the appearances 
the e is mo being (rest) but only becoming (motion)» we are still able .to 
dis :lngulsh one appearance from another* This is the sense of mitigation which 
w  ¿pacified previously. But in addition » it can be seen from the investigation 
of the ground of appearances, that further mitigations are required on the 
tr nsphenomenal level itself. Granted that there are only motions on this level, 
th i whole account of the various kinds of motions requires that we be able to 
distinguish one motion from another. ' Hence, there must be some element of 
constancy in the motions themselves to serve as the basis for the distinctions 
which are drawn. Furthermore, both the fast and the slow motions are said 
to possess their particular type of motion Mby nature** (156 d 2-3» 159 e 4).
Therefore, we would be .speaking "according to nature" by speaking of the "becoming" 
of parents and offspring rather than of their being. Yet something which has 
á definite nature Is, in a. sense » "brought to a standstill*4 even though that 
©atura consists in a certain type of motion. Given that Socrates is speaking 
for those who believe themselves to be affirming a theory of Radical Flux, 
there is a special irony in the demand that one speak "according to nature.”
If "nature" is in radical flux, then» contrary to the preceding account of 
fast mâ slow motions » there will be no distinct "naturest" and if there are 
distinct "natures,H then there cannot be' radical flux.
The same tension will be evident in the last stage of Socrates’ exposition·^
At 157 e 1 ~ 160 e 2 he addresses himself "to an objection which appeals to so^cs&keâ 
cases of mispe reviving · In occur rencas of dreams, illnesses, and so’on, it is 
not the case, so the objection rims, that what one perceives also is. Socrates 
attempts to refute the objection by appeal, to the Secret Doctrine of flux, making 
claims which would accord with the Radical interprétation, but using examples 
in accordance with the Mitigated Theory« He introduces the notion of being 
"wholly different” (Sàcûq ¿repay) end lie and Theaetetus agree that when one 
thing-is wholly different from another they can have nothing in common, either 
in terms of a dunamis or in any other respect« In addition, it is said that such 
m thing {that is wholly different) is unlike the other. In general, εί âpa ti 
outtfkxfvet & 0 ièv τφ yέγνεσδαι η áuSuoiov, ε£τε έαυτφ είτε ówíoómevow uèv ταϋτον
γίγνεσθαι, à ^ i o t o d ^ w  ôê έτερσοι (159 a é -8} The manner in which 
the."wholly different” is characterised does not at all follow the theory of 
Mitigated Flux as developed at 156 aff · The distinctions of types of motions
according to different powers and speeds, precludes rather than entails their 
being "wholly different" from one another. Any two motions with a passive 
dunamis would not be wholly différant from one another in the sense here
required» nor would a certain passive d uñarais at one time be wholly different
from itself at another time.
Hot only is the notion of being wholly different not in accord with
the Mitigated Theory developed at 156 aft., but it also fails to be in accord
with the cases to which Socrates appeals, ostensibly, as examples of the 
notion. He says that southing which is wholly different is unlike the other 
(159 a 3) and that when something is unlike, it becomes different: (159 a S) .
Hence* ’being wholly differentf and ’being unlike* are used equivalently.
Since ’being like* is negated by ’being unlike,* it is also negated by ’being 
wholly different.’ How ’being like* is correlated to ‘being the same.* If 
what is the same (or like) is simply what is not wholly different, it could 
Include, on the one hand, varying degrees of similarity which could progress 
all the way to total (specific) identity, or on the other hand, simple numerical 
self-identity. On toe basis of the claim that there exist, various motions 
having similarities in power, it seems quite reasonable to assume that a 
certain motion (e.g*, Socrates) could have a relatively stable self-identity 
(or "frequency”) and could be specificicâlly identical to another motion 
(e»g«9 Theaetetus),
Socrates’ treatment of the example must be examined to show how it 
is implicitly subsumed under these considerations of likeness or sameness.
It has been established that ‘being unlike1 is equivalent to ’being wholly 
different* s$ch that anything which could be characterized in one way could 
also he characterized in. the other (presuming, of course, that one could make 
sense at all ©f something wholly different in the manner described)« Socrates 
suggests that a concrete example of the principle be considered* Socrates ill, 
he maintains, Is (presumably, totally) different from Socrates well. The 
ground for this is that Socrates well, taken as a whole, is unlike .Socrates ill 
and, implicitly, that ’being different* and ’being unlike* are equivalent. let 
from these premises, it would not follow that Socrates well is wholly different 
from Socrates ill, but only that he is different as a whole. And being 
different as a whole allows for the „^ possibility that, the thing we speak of 
Is in some respects the same, though different in others (cf. 158 e 9 - 10).
In fact, this passive motion which is Socrates must be the same to a degree 
sufficient to designate it as Socrates. That Socrates well is not wholly 
different from Socrates ill is indicated also by the statement at 159 c 4-6 
that an agent will treat Socrates ill as something different from Socrates 
well. It is not said that the agent finds something which jLs (wholly) different.
We may agree that ultimately everything is in motion, but to be able t© speak 
of Socrates at all, a Socrates which could take on contrary attributes (6 totoÔTCÇ 
159 el), it is. necessary to posit that this motion which constitutes 
Socrates’ being (or becoming)'has some element of constancy.
'As the discussion continues, it is noted (159 c 11 - 12) that when ■
Socrates is in health the wine tastes sweet. The manner in which this aisthStcn 
is ta be accounted for is that: έγέννησε γαρ δη έκ των τιρωροΑογημέ^ν χό. τέ
•hqlüQv καί το πάσχαν τλυχύτητά τε καί, αίαθησιν, σρα φερόμενα άικρόχερα. (159 c 14- 
ά 2) So far, this is basically in accord with the account given at 156 aff.
The next lines, however, add something new; ή μεν αΕοάησίς προς του πώαχοντος 
ουαα αίαδανομένην την γλ&χταν àmpyâaaxof η δ&γλυχύτης προς τού οίνου περί 
αίτναν φερομένη γλυχύυ τον ο£νον xQ uytatvoüo!) γλώττο έποίσεν xat εϊναι χαΐ
$Q¿V6'08ai* (159 â 2 -  S3
According fea· the earlier account» tM wmmamz of the* agent enomteirleg 
the mveaieat of the patient generates twins of f spring*— *the pheiioMiiaL aistMsis 
mû aisthëton« · Although these lat tour do not. appear as -aotiooe*· thmf. ■ ·' '
aogsequently said, to have a transphenonettai aspect as îmt motion«* 
m  agent and patient act: as causea» whereas the offspring, {whether j&eooMhsl’ ·
.or t r&nsphenomenal>· are effects« What. iff ίι to make of the causal situating■■ 
in the present··passage? · ;
It would seem that the offspring themselves are acting as causes* let 
in what sense is ’offspring1 to be understood? If we suppose the passage to 
be concerned with phenomenal offspring» then a literal interpretation of causality 
is unintelligible* If agent and patient interact to produce the double aspect 
of a perceptual experience» how could these offspring act causally upon the 
agent and patient? A metaphorical interpretation of the."causality** tere 
operative would seem more tenable* To say that the alsthesls "makes" the 
tongue percipient and the aisthëton "mates” the wine sweet, would be no more 
than to m y  that the patient» s© modified by the action of the agent» becomes 
percipient of the agent qua perceived. 1*
However* a metaphorical interpretation is not the only on© possible*
The phrase *ô!pa φερόμενα άμφότε$α? is generally taken to 'mean that, the sweetness 
mû the perception which, are generated by agent and patient are simultaneously 
borne in m o v e m e n t If this is the case* then» since the perceived quality 
(sweetness) does not appear to move* the passage must be referring to offspring 
as trspsphenomenaX fast notions» which would make a literal interpretation of 
causality possible. I think, that this latter interpretation gives a more 
adequate account of the significance of the passage«**1
It is stated at 159 d $ that the aisthëton of sweetness* novinrg around 
the wine causes the wine both "to be and appear" sweet. According to'the 
®^taphoric&! interpretation - of causality* the meaning of the wine* $ "being" 
sweet would be exhausted by saying that it appears sweet. This would amount 
to no more than the Public Doctrine of Protagoras. Man is the measure of 
the "being" of all things (but only such ss and insofar as they are appearances). 
When it was said originally that "perception is. always of something that is” 
we noted that this statement could be interpreted in several ways. From the 
purely Frotagorean perspective of a sen&u&listie epistemology* it meant no 
mote than that perception is always of something that "is” such and such to 
a perceiver* But from a Platonic perspective* an adequate epistemology must 
provide some guarantee that it is connected to something more than a merely 
private perceptual object,· In other words* it must have an adequate objective 
ontological ground. Admittedly* Socrates1 exposition of the flux ontology does 
not represent Flato*s ultimate' stance on ontology as such* but his basic 
presupposition about objectivity is nonetheless operative here. Although 
agreeing that perceptions are absolutely.private and unique* he would see it 
to bes necessary that» if they are to count as knowledge in any sense* they 
must have an objective ground, (in this case* the causal actions of various 
motions). If we take the offspring mentioned in this passage to fee trans** 
phenomenal fast motions* which are really able to interact with slow motions» 
then the extra-perceptual ontological ground for Protagoras1 views can'be 
provided*
The aisthëton as a. fast motion causes the wine to be (or become) ©weet
in that a r a! alteration takes place in its (the· wine’s) motion, and as 
a result oí this alteration it appears sweet (i.e*, gives rise, to the aisthêton 
in the- plier intend 1 sense). A parallel analysis could be constructed for 
Socrates · i and the sensation of sourness* In effect, the aistheton is
mora that .n appearance of the quality, more even than an underlying fast motion*
It is ul‘ j lately an alteration in the "being11 of the object itself, which
varíes i i /irtue of alerations in the conditions of the percipient. Hence,
teman b< ir|s are indeed the measure of what is, of what exists outside the 
subject Ví realm of appearances.
erstes summarizes this results of his reflections on the percipient-as- 
%*ellf ¿ercipient-as-ill example and concludes that: ώστε είτε τις ειναί τι
èvopi et, τινι εζναι η τινδς η πρός τι όητέον αύτφ, είτε γίγνεσέαι* οώτδ 
66 έν CExjToö τι η Sv η γιγνόμενον οΟτε αύτφ λεχτέον aux* άλλου λέγοντας 
• âno& xréovr ώς ô λόγος ί>ν διελτ^ύ&ψεν οηυαένει* (160 b 8 - c 2) Here again 
we /ind the Secret Doctrine formula that "nothing is just by itself*" Given 
the m?mnér in which it is explicated, it Is obvious that it is not to be 
inf arpreted in the general ontological sense of Οχ* Mor, given the preceding 
re »lections, does it express mere eorrelativity of coming into being, but 
g es further in expressing the causal activity of the offspring on the parents*
The significance of Socratesfconcluding remarks now becomes clear*
. t%160 c 4-5 he says? oùhoüv ότε" .on το ¿ m  ttotoöv έρο£ êcrnv καί ούκ δλλφ 
ry¿ mdÎI αίσθάνομαι αΟτοο*- άλλος 6* oui The wine, in acting on Socrates,
*1β" for him and for no one else, in one sense because, by acting on him' 
it actualizes its potential as agent and his potential as patient. (This 
involves no Utore than the eorrelativity of agent and patient whose actualization 
at any moment a matter of contingency.) But once this actualization has 
taken place, then we can say lhat what acts on Socrates "is" for him in 
that, by virtue of its being perceived by him, it suffers changes in its^own 
"being." Hence, Socrates can say? άληθπς δρα έμοι η έμη αιοθπσις— της γαρ έμ?ίς 
<α6σ£ας άε£ έστιν~χαι έγώ κριτής κατά τον Ποοταγόραν των τε δντων έμοι ώς 
fern# xdt τώ^νη δντων ώς ούκ Sere tv* (160 c ? - 9) The phrase * της έρης ουσίας* 
plays more than a Protagorean role here. It refers not merely to Socrates* 
reality insofar,as it appears to him, but to the reality which his act of 
perception has generated on the transphenomenal level. He then concludes: 
me ä\|ddv άφευδης ών καί μη τιταίων τη όιαυοίφ περί τα όντα η γιγνάμενα ούκ. 
έπιοτήμων αν ειην ώνηερ αίαθητής; (160 d 1'- 3) Again, given an ontological 
foundation.to the process of perception, the "things of which 1 have perception" 
are no longer simply the phenomenal aistheta. They include as well the 
"things themselves" which are (more than merely) correlative to the perceptions. 
Toe ontological ground is provided which, for Plato, is a necessary part 
of any attempt whatsoever to formulate an epistemology.
* * *
A
Looking back on the exposition of the doctrine of flux, we can see 
that it has suffered many vicissitudes. Although continually expressed by 
the same formula (fnothing in one thing just by itself*), the significance 
which that formula bears, varies from one stage of the discussion to the next.
The most important fluctuation in meaning was seen to occur within the first 
ontological interpretation of the formula (0^ )· On this interpretation, the 
formula is to be read, "nothing is (esti) just by itself, rather everything is 
in a process of becoming (gignetai)*” The ambiguity of this interpretation 
is expressed by the distinction between "all things,are in change" and "all 
things result from change®1*
12-
àt ure noted earlier» «tien the flux theory le refuted later Its. the dialogue* 
It -is f tie Radical and not the Mitigated Theory which is overturned « Hence »
«Hen $ crates says that., we cannot admit that knowledge is percept;io«, t at 
least η the. basis of a theory of (radical) flux, this does' mot preclude the 
posait JLlty that· a theory of Mitigated Finie could provide the ground for 
Theaefcitm 9 definition«
M  it turns out Socrates does offer another argument to -show that knowledge 
Is not perception*. This argument does not consist, ' howeve % in a parallel 
refutation of the theory of ‘Mitigated Flu:«* but has its bat. is in an appeal, 
to the existence and functioning of the soul* Therefore * i ·■ ?*otild seem 
that» implicitly at least * the theory ©f Mitigated Flux stauit m  an. 
adequate account of the functioning of the senses« It could account for 
the mechanical pre-conditions of sense experience» although t, it for the 
experience itself* 7 As we are told at 184 d# we do not perc*· Ire with 
our senses· Esther our soul» using them as instruments» parce Ivas through 
them*
At the end of the examination of the first definition of knowledge, then, 
we - find that both the definition and its (radical) ontological ground have 
been refuted* let in neither case have we been left with the mere negativity 
of the avoidance of error* For the refutations are not mm.re refutations*
The overturning of the theory of Radical Flux leaves us free to return to. 
the exposition with a clearer eye for the previously hidden truth (άλήθεΐΟΕυ 
ânCMPipu|jévn^ ) of the theory of Mitigated Flux; and the destruction of the 
definition of* knowledge as aisthgsis by·an appeal to the functioning of 
the êénl provides the basis for the formulation end examination of 
jet another definition*
Motes
1· Lewis Campbell, The Tbeaetetus of ?lato(1861 rpt. New York; Arno Press*
1973)9 p. xlviii. Cf. also I* M. Crumble* An Examination of Plato1s 
• Doctrines» V. IÏ* (London; Routledge & Kegan Paul; Hew York; Humanities 
Press* 1963)* p. 26ff· Crombie follows G.E.L. Owen (Classical Quarterly» * 
1953) in maintaining that Plato refutes what I will call a doctrine of 
. Radical Flux.
2« Croffifele» EPP» V. IÏ» p. 11. Crombie speaks of these positions as "normal" 
and "rampant" Heracliteanism, respectively (p. 12)*
3. Crombie* EK>* v< XI* p. 13.
4. Three words in this statement (.* anthropos* yhosj ychrgTneta* ) are notoriously 
ambiguous. W.K.C. Guthrie» The Sophists (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press* 1971)* pp. 188-192» offers a concise discussion of a very elaborate 
debate. Regarding*anthropos»1 scholars question whether Protagoras was 
■using it to refer to the human species or to individual human beings or
■ whether he did not think to make the distinction. Guthrie holds that 
Protagoras was referring to individuals* and it is clear from the discussion 
in the Theaetetus that Socrates interprets the ten in this way.
The word *hgsf in the phrase f hos est in1 could have two possible meanings :
(a) as equivalent to fhot!» * so that yhos estin* would mean "that they are";
(b) as indicating manner, so that ghos estin* would mean "how they are."
Guthrie maintains that* although rhos* can'mean "how*" "that" is more ·, 
likely in the present context, because of the occurrence of *h<5s* in the 
following negative clause, 'hos ouk esti. * Guthrie goes on to point out 
that the meaning of festi* is just as crucial as the meaning of *hbs.1 Ha
agrees with Kahn ("The Greek Verb "to be" and the Concept of Being»"
Foundations of Language, Vol· 2» No* 3* 1966, pp. 245-65) in holding that the
basic sense of *esfciy is not "to exist" but "to.be so*" "to be the case*"
or "to be true»" and that the existential meaning is a special example of 
the general factual .statement intended by Protagoras* *h5s esti»y Thus» 
given this view of *esti,1 Protagoras* statement would cover claims 
concerning both existence and qualification* i.e.» claims that something 
1C·* ris» as well as claims how.something.is.- However* If one had assumed that 
hos* indicates manner only, then the meaning of *estiy would have to be 
correspondingly restricted*. In the Theaetetus» Socrates explicitly takes 
Protagoras® statement in this more limited sênse (152 a 6 -8 and 152 c 1 -3)* 
Nonetheless, when he equates Theaetetus* definition, of knowledge With 
Protagoras1 two statements, he also emphasises that perception (and knowlÄfge) 
is of that which exists (152 c 5) and* as Socrates5 exposition continues*
...'we find that "that which exists" includes a transphenomenal being (or becoming)
. that Is distinct from appearances. This emphasis and development, however, see 
to be the work of Flato. Guthrie would appear to agree on this point* since 
he said earlier (p„ 186) that Protagoras was an extreme subjectivist * 
Furthermore* although he supports Kahn’s contention that.according to 
Protagoras, a person is "the measure of the existence or non-existence of 
atoms just as he is the measure of the being-cold or not-being-cold of 
* .the wind." (Kahn* p. 250)* he enters a disclaimer regarding the transphenomenal
* ' implications of Kahn’s thesis«
/ f€hrema* is a word of very diverse meanings, but Guthrie suggests (p. 191)
thét it be translated by the indeterminate ’thing,1 which would include
prop rfci«® m  «δtribut«s auch m  hmt or mid., as well m  Jmtic* und 
is»Jr itlciù M  Plat© hm Baetuté® "follow up" Fsotsgaras* ntetemmte by 
mem I of rte thernry of flu»;** jgtjgigag¿ would include the trm«phenoieen&l 
motions which are taken to be the reality of phenomenal "substances" as, 
welt ai those which are taken to be the reality of phenomena! properties 
(efe the discussion of parents and offsrplng at 156 -*ff«)*
5« There is some disagreement among translators of this passage due to the
ambiguity of* lege in»8 which can mean either "ito mean” or flto say*" Socrates* 
words at 152 a 6 could mean .that Protagoras speaks in some such way (i»e«* 
this is another Protagorean quote) or that he means (the previous "man is 
the me&ñuxe** statement) in some auch way* He Bowel!» citing Cratylus 386 a 
1-3* favors the former (cf. Flato» Thesetêtus» translated with notes by 
John HrDowell (Oxfords The Clarendon Presa» 1973)» p* 119)* Comford» 
also, citing the Cratylus » agrees (cl* F· M. Con* ford# Plato *s Theory of 
% (Mew Yorks Bobbs-Merrill €©** Inc·* 1957)» p* 32 » b* 1). At any
rate» whether or not 152 a 6 indicates another quote from Protagoras* Socrates 
assimilate this statement to the former ose*
6* !* would thus disagree with Com ford who- maintains that Protagoras probably
held that the wind in itself is both warm and cold (Comford, FTK» p* 34),-*
The weakness of Comforts arguments is shown'by Guthrie» The Sophists» pp® 
184^186 and by J. P· Maguirey "Protagoras— or Plato?96 Fhronasis» Vol. XVIII» 
2* 1973* p* 120* Cf* also MeBowell# Theaetetus» p* Ilf* *
7·* J© ?· Maguire* "Protagoras— or Platotw p. 121«
8« I am referring, of course* to Socratess emphasis upon t e  the wind appears 
C1S2 a - c}*^not to the "innocent" insertion of the phrase να6τ5 &i^èæTaCL*
f· Auguste Bifes* trans·» Thdêtite (Pariés Société 4*eü±titm "les Beiles Lettres* 
If24), p* 131« ’ '
10« Although · aisthesis m é  aisthg ton will also be interpreted transphenmmnaily* · 
this does not destroy their basic phenomenal status*
X!· It is certainly implied* however» by Socrates1 suggestion at 154 a 8 that 
& person is never in a condition similar to himself. Yet this statement is 
»re in accord with the radical interpret ion of the flux doctrine and will 
find its echo at» among other places» 158 e 10 with Its mention of & C  
έτερον*
*
12* this transphenomenal status of the-offspring is perhaps implicit at 154 at» 
hut it is veiled hy the insistent use of phainesthai at 153 e 7 and IS4 a 3·
13· Me Dwell, Theaetetos# p. 23; €ατηΐοτά§ fTKg p* 47«
14® Crombie explores the possibility of a metaphorical interpretation in an 
aven more radical way by positing a phenomenal ism in which even agent and
. . patient are purely phenomenal ¿EFB* V*. XI* p* 22-23)«
15· €£· *Comford*8 translation* PTK, p« 55; and Me Doweling* Theaetefcos* p· 28«
l*· Creable, after elaborating the (radical) metaphorical interpretation, 
admits that it does not account for everything Plato says, since Flato 
alsj holds that slow and fast motions are physical processes (EPD* ¥. II*
P» 23). B© thus coacitsees that Plasoss doctrine is probably inconsistent 
Cf. 24). On ©or interpretation, Plato is not inconsistent.
1?. Croabie would see® t© agre® (EPP. V. ÏI, M). · · ·
